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Abstract  
This study aimed to analyse the factors that affect the motivation for the management of earnings management 
activities in the automotive sector manufacturing companies and component 2011-2013. Some of the factors that 
affect earnings management motivation used in this study is a bonus motivation, motivation debt contracts, and 
motivation political costs (the size of the company). Source of data used in this study is empirical data obtained 
from Indonesian capital market consists of the annual financial statement data and other supporting data. The 
sample of this study consisted of 12 companies manufacturing automotive sector and components that publish 
annual financial statements for 2011-2013. Analysis of the data using the modified Jones models and is equipped 
with a descriptive analysis, the classical assumption test, and test hypotheses. The results of this study show that 
(1) the partial methods, motivation bonus (ROA) but no significant negative effect on earnings management. 
Motivation debt (leverage) has a positive effect and no significant effect on earnings management. Meanwhile, 
the cost of political motivation (the size of the company) has a positive but not significant effect on earnings 
management. (2) Simultaneously, motivation bonus (ROA), motivation debt (leverage) and the motivation of the 
political cost (size of the company) has a positive and significant impact of earnings management. 
Keywords: Earnings Management, Motivation Bonus, Debt Contracts Motivation, Motivation Company Size 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One source of information in assessing the performance of the company is a financial statement. The financial 
report is a summary of a recording process, from financial transactions that occurred during the financial year 
concerned. According to the Indonesian Institute of Accountants, financial statements are the result of the 
accounting process that aims to provide information about the financial position, performance, and current 
companies that benefit the majority of users report in order to make economic decisions and demonstrate 
accountability (stewardship) management on the use of resources entrusted to them. User information includes 
financial statements: investors, employees, lenders, suppliers, customers, government, and society in general. 
One of the information contained in the financial statements is information on profits. Earnings or 
profits are often used as a basis for decision-making of various stakeholders, such as use as a base to give 
bonuses to managers, are used as the basis for calculating the taxable income, and also worn as work assessment 
Criteria Company. Therefore, it is often also managers take advantage of opportunities to manipulate earnings 
figures with engineering accrual to affect the outcome of various decisions such as motivation bonus, considered 
to perform better or to minimize the burden of income tax to be paid by the company. 
Nevertheless, the accrual basis in the financial statements provides an opportunity for managers to 
modify the financial statements to generate profits (earnings) desired. Generally accepted accounting principle 
(GAAP) or generally accepted accounting principles also provide flexibility for managers to choose accounting 
methods that will be used in preparing the financial statements. This is consistent with the positive accounting 
theory which allows the manager to choose a particular accounting method. Actions that can make financial 
reports to be good, action is often referred to as the earnings management. 
Earnings management performed by the manager arises because of the agency problem is the conflict of 
interest between owners / shareholders (principals) with manager / management (agent) as a result of not 
meeting the maximum utility among them because management has more information about the company from 
the shareholders that occurs asymmetry of information that allows management accounting practices oriented 
towards profit to achieve a certain performance. Agency conflict that resulted in the management of 
opportunistic actions that reported earnings is false, will lead the company's value is reduced in the future. 
There are various motivations that supposedly underlies and encourage a manager behave opportunistic. 
Motivations will affect the pattern of managerial engineering by management companies. Positive accounting 
theory has three hypotheses that form the basis of the main motivations that managers perform earnings 
management bonuses, contract debts and political costs. In the bonus motivation stated that the management will 
get a bonus if certain corporate performance targets. Promise this bonus will motivate managers to manage 
earnings at a certain level in accordance with the required limit. In this case, the manager will perform earnings 
management by increasing profits in order to obtain greater compensation from the company. The second 
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motivation is motivation debt contract. Managers will conduct aggressive earnings management to prevent 
violations of the debt contract. Managers do earnings management by increasing earnings to avoid violating the 
debt limit. Last motivation is political costs which larger companies will do more policies that will lead to 
decreased profits for the purpose of reducing the political effects. 
The problem of this research is: Is the bonus motivation, motivation debt contracts, and motivation 
political costs (firm size) effect on earnings Management Company and component manufacturing automotive 
sector in Indonesia stock exchange? 
 
2. THEORY FRAMEWORK 
Financial Statements 
According to the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (2009: 1), the financial statements include the part of the 
financial statements. Complete financial statements typically include a balance sheet, income statement, 
statement of changes in equity, statement of changes in financial position (which can be expressed in various 
ways for example, as a cash flow statement / funds flow statement), notes and other statements and explanatory 
material that are an integral part of the financial statements. 
According to the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (2009: 3), the objective of financial statements is 
to provide information concerning the financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an 
enterprise that is useful for a large number of users in making economic decisions. 
Financial report is required by each company to determine the progress and setbacks of his efforts. The 
financial statements are also used as the basis for determining or assessing the financial position of the company. 
Where the results of the analysis of the interested parties can take a decision to invest in a company. 
 
Profit Management 
In general, earnings management is defined as a company manager to intervene or influence the information in 
the financial statements for the purpose of deceiving the stakeholders who want to know the performance and 
condition of the company. Managers can choose several accounting policies for calculating earnings without 
violating GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles). 
According Sulistyanto (2008: 161), earnings management is done by playing the components of 
accruals in the financial statements, because the accrual component can be a numbers game through the 
accounting method used in accordance with the wishes of the person doing the recording and preparation of 
financial statements. Component accrual is a component that does not require proof of physical cash so toying 
with the size of the accrual component does not have to be accompanied by cash received or issued by the 
company. 
Based on the above understanding can be concluded that earnings management is an intervention in the 
external financial reporting process with a view to personal gain. Earnings management is done with the purpose 
of manipulating the users of financial statements. This understanding is consistent with agency theory which 
states that the separation of ownership and management of the company will encourage managers seek to 
maximize welfare, although they had to manipulate the data to other parties. 
 
Discretionary Accruals 
According Sulistyanto (2008: 164), accrual accounting is divided into two components, namely discretionary 
accruals and nondiscretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals are the accrual component of managerial 
engineered by utilizing the freedom and flexibility in the use of estimates and accounting standards. 
Nondiscretionary accruals an accrual component obtained naturally from the accrual-basis accounting standards 
follow general. An example of nondiscretionary accruals is a method of determining depreciation and inventory 
are chosen must follow the methods that are recognized in the accounting principles. Whereas in the more 
discretionary accruals are given freedom, making it easier to toyed with the managerial policy. Total accruals 
consist of a number of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. 
 
Motivation Bonus 
In the bonus plan or managerial compensation, the owner of the company promised that the manager will receive 
a bonus if the performance of the company reaches a certain amount. This means that the bigger the bonus that 
would be obtained managers, the greater the motivation of managers to manage earnings. Profitability ratios used 
in this study is the return on assets (ROA), where the return on assets (ROA) shows the company's ability to 
generate profits earned based on the total assets of the company. The capital structure of the company usually 
consists of internal and external capital. Capital raised from external parties in the form of a loan from the lender. 
The loan would require the presence of good corporate responsibility in the use and repayment of the loan. The 
creditors will constantly monitor and require information about the financial state of the company to ensure that 
the company will be able to meet its obligations at maturity. 
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Motivation Debt Contracts 
Based on the hypothesis of a debt contract, the company will conduct an aggressive earnings management to 
prevent violations of the debt contract (Watts, Zimmerman, 1986). Therefore, the amount of debt the company 
will motivate management to manage earnings. 
Septa Dwi Aryani (2011: 207) debt variables can be measured by leverage. Leverage is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total capital of the company. The greater the leverage ratio, means that the higher the value of the 
company's debt. This size is strictly related to the presence and absence of a debt agreement. Companies that 
have high leverage ratios alleged earnings management because the company will have difficulty in obtaining 
additional funding from the creditors even threatened the company cannot meet debt payment obligations on 
time. Management will increase the profit (income increasing accruals) to avoid breaching the debt limit. The 
greater the leverage to be owned by the company, the greater the motivation of managers to manage earnings. 
 
Motivation Political Cost (Size Company) 
Firm size is a scale in which large and small companies can be classified. Watts, Zimmerman (1986) in the 
positive accounting theory states that the size of the company are used as guidelines for the political costs and 
political costs will increase with firm size and risk. Negative effect of firm size with earnings management. This 
happens because large companies tend to use accounting procedures which lowers profits for tax purposes. 
Schematically, the motivation that can affect managers in managing earnings can be shown on the following 
picture: 
Picture 1.Logical Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 
Based on the above formulation of the problem, then the hypothesis formulated in this study are: 
H1: Motivation bonuses negatively affect earnings management 
H2: Motivation debt contract positive effect on earnings management 
H3: Motivation sized companies a positive effect on earnings management 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
Population and Sample Research 
In this research, which made the entire population is in the form of data or documents and financial annual report 
on the company manufactures automotive sector and components listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
This study uses empirical data with the sample companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) 2011-2013 
by 12 companies manufacture automotive and components sector, with a purposive sampling method is used as 
the sampling method. Some of the criteria set by the researchers in selecting the sample, among others: 
1. The company manufactures automotive sector and the components listed on the Stock Exchange in 
2011-2013 
2. The company that issued audited financial statements for the period ended December 31, 2011-2013 
3. Data on the variables to be studied research available in full in the company's annual financial 
statements published in 2011-2013 
 
Variable analysis 
Dependent variable in this research is earnings management. Accruals discretionary use as a proxy for earnings 
management is computed using the modified Jones model developed by Jones in 1991. These proxies are used to 
determine the magnitude of discretionary accruals (DA) due to earnings management occurs when the value of 
DA> 0. The model is written as follows: 
TACit = NIit – CFOit 
Motivation Bonus 
(ROA) 
 
Motivation Debt 
Contracts 
(leverage) 
 Motivation 
Political Cost (Size 
Company) 
 
Earnings Management  
(Discretionary Accurals) 
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The total value of accruals (TAC) was estimated by the regression equation Ordinary Least Square (OLS) as 
follows: 
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By using the above regression coefficient value of non-discretionary accruals (NDA) can be calculated by the 
formula: 
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Further discretionary accruals (DA) can be calculated as follows: 
DAit = 
1
,
−t
it
TA
TAC
 – NDAit 
 
Specification: 
DA  = Discretionary accrual  
NDA =  Non-Discretionary accrual 
TACi,t-1       = Total accruals for firm i in year t-1  
NIit = Net Income / Net profit of firm i in period t  
CFO  = cash flow from operating activities of firm i in period t 
TAit        = total assets of firm i in year t-1 
SALES∆  = Changes in earnings of firm i in period t 
∆REC  = Changes in receivables firm i in period t 
 =   error terms 
Independent variables in this study are a bonus motivation, motivation debt, politically motivated charges. 
Motivation Bonus 
Return on Assets (ROA) is a ratio to measure the ability of management to generate revenue from asset 
management. The higher this ratio means that the company more effective in utilizing the assets to produce a net 
profit after tax. The formula used is as follows: 
ROA =     EBIT 
Total Asset 
Motivation Debt (Leverage) 
The company's ability is to meet its obligations in proxied by the leverage which is measured using financial 
ratios. The equation used to calculate the leverage is as follows: 
 Leverage = Total Debt 
        Total Asset 
Motivation Political Cost (Size Company) 
Company size (size) is a measure of the size of a company. Company size in this study is a reflection of the 
small size of the company that appeared in the total assets of the company. The formula used is as follows: 
Company size (SIZE) = Ln (Total Assets) 
Data Analysis Methods 
The method of analysis in this study using multiple linear regression (multiple linear regression). Multiple 
regression analysis can explain the influence of the dependent variable with several independent variables. In 
multiple regression analysis required several steps and analysis tools. Before performing multiple linear 
regression analysis first tested the descriptive statistics and classical assumption. To simplify the analyses used 
SPSS 21 software (Statistical Package for Social Science). 
Descriptive statistics illustrate the direct relationship between data collection and presentation of data 
and summarizing the results of summary. In other words statistics (mean) standard deviation, variance, 
maximum, minimum, sum, range. So that in this study the results of the analysis of data obtained qualified 
testing, the study tested the assumption to prove that the model used is normal and does not contain the 
symptoms of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity. Then, test the hypothesis with multiple 
regression analysis models. In general, multiple regression analysis is essentially the study of the classical 
dependency dependent variable (bound) with one or more independent variables (explanatory variables / free) 
with whole estimating and / or predicting the population mean or average value of the dependent variable based 
on the value independent variables are known (Ghozali, 2006: 81). Multiple regression models used are as 
follows: 
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DA = a + b1ROA + b2 LEVERAGE + b3 UP + ε 
Specification: 
DA = Discretionary Accrual (earnings management) 
ROA = Return on Assets (Motivation Bonus) 
LEVERAGE = Leverage (Debt Contracts Motivation) 
UP = Company Size (Motivation Political Cost) 
a = constant 
b1 = magnitude of the effect of ROA 
b2 = magnitude of the effect of Leverage 
b3 = magnitude of the effect size of the Company 
ε = error 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The data used on Discretionary Accrual, ROA, LEV, and SIZE are used in this study are from the annual 
financial statements of the company samples downloaded on the website www.idx.co.id. 
Descriptive Analysis 
This analysis describes the qualitative analysis using descriptive statistics that will discuss the distribution of the 
data using SPSS. Results, if the data is intended to determine the level of goodness models and the influence of 
each independent variable on the dependent variable. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
DA 24 .0000 .2686 .097600 .0698071 
ROA 24 .0000 .2696 .085341 .0686208 
LEV 24 .2020 .7045 .450642 .1542296 
SIZE 24 12.1133 30.7363 22.236226 5.8206694 
Valid N (listwise) 24     
Based on Table 1, it is known that there are four variables DA research, ROA, LEV, SIZE with an 
overall sample size of 24 samples. Earnings management variables (DA) have an average value of 0.97600 with 
a standard deviation of 0.698071 and a minimum value of 0.0000 and the maximum value of 0.2686. Motivation 
variable bonus (ROA) has an average value of 0.85341 with a standard deviation of 0.0686208 and has a 
minimum value of 0.0000 and the maximum value of 0.2696. Motivation variable debt contracts (LEV) has an 
average rating of 0.450642 with a standard deviation of 0.1542296 and has a minimum value of 0.2020 and a 
maximum value of 0.7045. Variable size of the company (SIZE) has an average value of 22.236226 with a 
standard deviation of 5.8206694 and a minimum value of 12.1133 and 30.7363 maximum values. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Test coefficient of determination (R2) is intended to assess the goodness of the model of the regression equation, 
which gives the proportion or percentage of the total variation in the dependent variable explained by the 
independent variables. 
 
Table 2. Test The coefficient of determination (R2) 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 .564a .319 .216 .0617964 2.239 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE, LEV, ROA 
b. Dependent Variable: DA 
 
From Table 2 above,it shows that the R of 0.577 and the coefficient of determination of 0.216. This 
suggests that the ability of independent variables such as motivation bonuses, debt, and the size of the company 
will explain the dependent variable is the variance of earnings management amounted to 21% and by 79% 
variance of earnings management that has not been able to be explained by the independent variable in this 
study. 
Simultaneous significance test (F test) is used to determine whether the independent variables which 
include a bonus motivation, motivation debt contracts, and the size of the companies jointly influence the 
dependent variable is earnings management. 
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Table 3. Significance Simultaneous Test (Test F) 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .036 3 .012 3.116 .049a 
Residual .076 20 .004   
Total .112 23    
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SIZE, LEV, ROA 
b. Dependent Variable: DA 
 
Based on Table 3, which is the result of the F test (simultaneous test), known calculated F value of 
3.116 with a significance value of 0.049. From the test results, then Ho is rejected, meaning that the independent 
variable is ROA, LEV, and SIZE alongside other control variables affect the dependent variable is earnings 
management. 
Regression coefficient test (t test) was used to determine the influence of independent variables such as 
motivation bonuses, debt, and the size of the company on the dependent variable is earnings management, we 
used the results of the t test to compare the estimated probability value. If the probability value is less than α = 
5%, it can be said to have an influence. The results of testing the hypothesis presented in the following table: 
 
Table 4. t-Test 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) .007 .069 
 
-.108 .915 
  
ROA -.329 .193 -.323 -1.698 .105 .942 1.061 
LEV .163 .086 .361 1.899 .072 .942 1.061 
SIZE .002 .002 .167 .905 .376 1.000 1.000 
a. Dependent Variable: DA 
 
From Table 4 it can be seen the following regression equation: 
Y = 0.007 to 0.329 (X1) + 0.163 (X2) + 0.002 (X3) 
Specification: 
Y = Profit Management 
X1 = Motivation Bonus (ROA) 
X2 = Motivation Debt Contracts (LEV) 
X3 = Motivation Company Size (SIZE) 
From the regression equation above shows that the hypothesis of this study indicated that: 
 
Motivation bonuses to earnings management 
Based on the analysis results can be seen that the value of the unstandardized coefficients ROA against DA is -
0.329 with significance level of 0.105. From the results of the regression testing, it can be explained that the 
motivation bonus no significant effect on earnings management. Although, not significant, but the negative sign 
on the coefficient describing the existence of a negative relationship between motivation in doing earnings 
management bonuses. The results of this study failed to indicate a bonus plan as motivation manager in 
managing earnings. Arguments possible failure hypothesis because its owner determines the bonus is not seen 
from ROA but based on the amount of the bonus targets that have been set by the company earlier. 
 
Motivation contract debt to earnings management 
Based on the analysis results can be seen that the value of the variable LEV unstandardized coefficients of the 
DA is 0.163 with a significance level of 0.072. From the test results can be explained that the debt levels had no 
significant effect on earnings management. Positive sign on the coefficients indicate a positive relationship 
between debt contracts with earnings management. The greater the level of debt coefficient, the higher the 
manager will act profit management companies. 
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Motivation size companies to earnings management 
Based on the analysis results can be seen that the value of the variable SIZE unstandardized coefficients of the 
DA is 0.002 with a significance level of 0.376 (> 0.05). From the results of the regression testing, it can be 
explained that the size of the company does not have a significant effect on earnings management. Positive sign 
on the coefficients describe the existence of a positive relationship between firm size and earnings management. 
Although the relationship is not significant but the sign on the coefficient has been able to explain the existence 
of a positive relationship. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
Conclusion 
Based on the results of research and discussion in advance, it can be concluded that: 
Motivation bonuses (ROA), partially negative impact (-0.329) but is not significant (0.105) to earnings 
management. But simultaneously have a positive impact on earnings management (<0.05). This indicates that 
the level of bonuses given to the company owner managers can not contribute to the manager in managing 
earnings. 
Motivation contract debt (leverage), partially positive effect (0.163) but also is not significant (0.72) to 
earnings management. Simultaneously providing a positive effect on earnings management (<0.05). This 
indicates that the company's debt level can contribute to managers in managing earnings. 
Motivation political costs (the size of the company) in partial positive effect (0.002) but not significant 
(0.376) to earnings management. But simultaneously have a positive impact on earnings management (<0.05). 
This indicates that the political costs (the size of the company) cannot contribute to the manager in managing 
earnings. 
 
Advice and recommendations to the next research 
Based on the analysis of research and discussion, we then formulated a number of recommendations aimed at 
advanced researchers, investors and issuers in particular related to earnings management, among others: 
Further research is expected to use another proxy in determining the value of the bonus motivation. 
Further research may add other independent variables are supposed to influence the earnings management. 
Further research is expected to use a different proxy in finding the value of earnings management. So, they can 
see their earnings management with different viewpoints. 
For investors expected with this research can be more selective in choosing the company that is devoted 
to investment, with not only the look but the company's earnings to consider internal and external supervision to 
minimize the risk of investment mistakes. 
Limitation of the Research  
From the research that has been done, the researchers discovered the limitations of the problems 
encountered during the process of research, among others: 
1. Company sampled in this study only one type of manufacturing companies namely automotive and 
components sector. 
2. Data used in the study only used a written financial report obtained from data download 
3. Research just use a period of 3 years running (2011-2013) that may be made from previous year 
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